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Replication studies

These studies forcus on unemployment duration and the effect of the potential duration of unemployment benefits.

  • Lalive, R. van Ours, J. and J. Zweimuller (2006), “How Changes in Financial Incentives Affect the Duration of Unemployment.” The Review of Economic Studies, 73, 4, 1009-1038. problem statement

  • Chetty, R (2008), “Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance”, Journal of Political Economy, 116, 2, 173-234. problem statement

  • Chetty’s data has then been subsequently used by Kroft and Notowidigdo (2016, Restud) in order to trace how the insured unemployment duration varies with the business cycle. This is done simply by augmenting Chetty’s PH specification by the interaction between unemployment benefit and the state’s unemployment duration at the start of the spell \(( \log(b_{s,t}) \times \log(u_{s,t_0}) )\), where \(s\) indicates the state.

  • For a recent survey, see Lopes, M.C. (2021).”A review on the elasticity of unemployment duration to the potential duration of unemployment benefits.” Journal of Economic Surveys. See also Chetty and Finkelstein (2013), pp. 151 in Chapter 3, “Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data”, in the Handbook of Public Economics.

Some recent papers

Unemployment durations:

Topic paper methods
potential benefit duration Kroft, K. and M.J. Notowidigdo (2016, Restud). “Should Unemployment Insurance Vary with the Unemployment Rate? Theory and Evidence” PH
job quality Nekoei, A. and A. Weber (2017, AER). “Does Extending Unemployment Benefits Improve Job Quality?” RDD

Beyond unemployment durations: Some recent examples in the economics literature.

Topic paper methods
duration of immigration spells Bijwaard, Schluter and Wahba (2014, RESTAT). “The Impact of Labour Market Dynamics on the Return-Migration of Immigrants.” MPH
time-to-reincarceration, recidivism Mastrobuoni and Pinotti (2015, AEJ: AppEcon). “Legal Status and the Criminal Activity of Immigrants” PH
Yang (2017, JPubEcon). “Local labor markets and criminal recidivism” PH
time-to-default Kaminsky and Vega-García (2016, JEEA). “Systemic and idiosyncratic sovereign debt crises” PH
Nagel and Purnanandam (2020, RFS). “Banks’ risk dynamics and distance to default” PH
firm survival, bankruptcy Fernandes and Paunov (2015, RESTAT). “The risks of innovation: are innovating firms less likely to die?” discrete time hazards
option exercise, time-to-purchase Décaire et al. (2020, RFS).”Real option exercise: Empirical evidence” PH
Seetharaman and Chintagunta (2003, JBES). “The proportional hazard model for purchase timing: a comparison of alternative specifications”